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Abstract: This paper describes major external changes to the U.S. public agricultural research 
system over 1988-1999; describes the reactions of the public agricultural research system to the 
external changes, specifying the innovations that have occurred over the last decade; and draws 
conclusions about the present and future performance of the U.S. research system. The decade of 
the 1990s brought slow growth to public agricultural research funding. CSREES tried to 
stimulate greater interests in competitive grant programs. The states have generally resisted this 
move. A major asymmetry exists in the sharing of transactions costs associated with external 
peer-reviewed competitive grant programs. This is especially true when the average grant size is 
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In the United States, the R&D system for agriculture is one of shared financing and 
conducting research.  Both types of activities occur in the public and private sectors.  Within the 
public sector, financing is also shared between the federal government and 50 state governments, 
but in 1988, the state governments accounted for about twice as many resources as the federal 
government.  Public agricultural research is conducted primarily in the Agricultural Research 
Service (ARS) and Economic Research Service (ERS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and in the state agricultural experiment stations of the state land-grant university 
system.  In financing agricultural research, there are net transfers of resources from the federal 
government and private industry and commodity groups to the state agricultural experiment 
station (SAES) system. There is very little public sector financing of agricultural research in the 
private sector.  In 1988, approximately 50 percent more resources were allocated to conducting 
agricultural research in the private than public sector, and within the public sector, about 50 
percent more resources were allocated to agricultural research in the SAES system than in the 
USDA=s research agencies (Huffman and Evenson 1993).  
A complex set of forces that affect the finance and organization of public agricultural 
research were operating in the United States during the past decade, and they have brought  
changes.   The political environment at the national level was unusual during 1988 to 1998.  It 
followed the Reagan Presidential term (1980-1988) where federal tax rates were cut and tax 
policy streamlined to reduce government revenue in an attempt to squeeze down the size of 
federal government operations.  When government expenditure reduction proved more difficult 
than tax reductions to achieve, a rapidly growing federal government deficit occurred.  The  
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deficit grew to the mid-1990s when it became apparent that a national economic disaster was 
approaching.  In 1995, the U.S. Congress set out to balance the federal budget, and new 
legislation was finally passed in 1996 which has as its goal achieving a balance federal budget by 
2002.  This meant cutting federal government expenditures in real terms significantly.  However, 
due to some unusual federal program changes (e.g., dramatically restructuring the national 
welfare program) and fortuitous economic events, the federal budget balance occurred much 
earlier than anticipated--in 1998 rather than 2002 (Clinton 1999).  Thus, many of the unusual 
adjustments that were occurring over the reference period seem to be completed.  
The objectives of this paper are: (i) to describe major external changes to the public 
agricultural research system, (ii) to describe the reactions of the public agricultural research 
system to the external changes, specifying the innovations that have occurred over the last 
decade, and (iii) to draw conclusions about the present and future performance of the U.S. 
research system.  The paper draws heavily upon Huffman and Just (1999a,b,c) and Huffman and 
Evenson (1993).  A recent report on the colleges of agriculture (Committee on the Future of the 
Colleges of Agriculture et al. 1995) and a book by Alston and Pardey (1996) also provide 
important information about the organization of agricultural research in the United States.  The 
story unfolds in the following sections. 
Key Developments that have affected the Agricultural Research System 
Changing demands for public agricultural research.  Income and price changes have 
been a major force for changing the demand for public agricultural research, resource and 
environmental quality, and food safety.  Khanna, Huffman, and Sandler (1994) have shown that 
the demand for public agricultural research is income and price responsive.  They tested pure and  
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impure models of public good demand and concluded that an impure public goods model of the 
demand for public agricultural research by state governments fits well and better than a pure 
public goods model.  They showed that the demand is price elastic but income inelastic. 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to extend these results to federal government behavior. With 
real federal government revenues (net of trust fund revenues) declining 21 percent over 1988 to 
1997 and real state government revenues (net of intergovernmental transfers) growing about 27 
percent, there were major economic forces for restructuring public sector support of agricultural 
research. 
Research that enhances farm productivity benefits domestic consumers when farm 
products are inputs to domestic food and fiber consumption and foreign consumers when farm 
products are exported.  Consumers pay lower prices, receive better quality or more diverse 
products.  U.S. families spent only 16 percent of personal consumption expenditures on food in 
1988 and this share was down to 12 percent by 1998.  As U.S. consumers= concerns for food 
costs have lessened, other consumer concerns have become more visible, e.g., food safety, fat 
content, processing, technology used to produce the product (Committee on the Future of the 
College of Agriculture et al. 1995, p. 22-24). 
 
Households= demand for resource and environmental amenities, for food safety, and for 
food processing are income elastic but for unprocessed food and food at home it is income 
inelastic (Antle 1999a,b).  During 1988-1998, U.S. per capita real income grew at an average 
rate of about 2 percent, but this was about one-half the rate for the previous decade (Clinton 
1999).  Thus, income growth was continuing to shift U.S. households= expenditure shares toward  
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income elastic goods and services, i.e., resource and environmental amenities, food safety, and 
food processing, and away from income inelastic goods and services, e.g., unprocessed food, 
food at home.  Income driven changes in households= demand, however, were occurring at a 
slower pace during the 1988-98 period than during the preceding decade. 
During 1988-98, the aggregate supply of U.S. domestic agricultural output grew at an 
average rate of about 3 percent, 1.9 percent for animal products and 3.5 percent for plant 
products (Ahearn et al 1996).  Relative to the preceding decade, these should be compared to 
1.3 percent, 1.6 percent, and 1.2 percent respectively.  Thus, during the most recent decade, the 
domestic supply of agricultural output was growing relatively rapid.  Furthermore, total factor 
productivity was growing at an average rate of about 2.9 percent during 1988-98, and this was 
slightly faster than during the preceding decade.  Thus, rapid productivity change most likely 
was a drag on the demand for public agricultural research during both the current and past 
decade. 
R&D leading to new technologies for farming has also raised public concern because of 
possible negative impacts of farm chemicals on human health, of tillage practices and chemicals 
on soil and water quality, and new farming practices generally on wildlife and the composition 
of the landscape.  Research has shown that agricultural chemicals and soil sediments are 
impairing the quality of some surface and groundwater sources and imposing costs on water 
users (USDA 1997).  This evidence has increased the demand for research on new production 
technologies that are cost effective and less degrading of the environment and human health 
(Committee on the Future of Agricultural Colleges et al. 1995).  
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Although the USDA=s competitive research grants program was first established in 1977 
to address high-priority research areas identified by an advisory committee to the secretary of 
agriculture and somewhat refocused in the mid-1980s on biotechnology, it was re-named the 
National Research Initiatives Competitive Grants program in the 1990 farm bill.  The purpose of 
the NRI is to support high-priority fundamental and mission-oriented research of importance in 
the biological, environmental, physical, and social sciences relevant to agriculture, food, and the 
environment.  The broad parameters of the NRI program, including the major program areas, 
were legislated in the 1990 Farm Bill.  The legislation requires that stakeholders and others have 
input. 
The 1995 farm bill debate was very much affected by the interests of Congress in 
balancing the federal budget by 2002.  When the farm bill was actually passed in 1996, it 
removed all production restrictions on farmers= use of land except for the planting of fruits and 
vegetables and minimum conservation requirements, eliminated deficiency or income payments 
that were market-price based, and established a new research program called the Fund for Rural 
America.  The main effects of the new legislation has been increased production of soybeans and 
corn (reduced production of small grains and cotton), somewhat greater uncertainty about output 
 prices, and increased inter-regional competition.  The addition of the Fund for Rural America 
seemed to be in anticipation of new research problems that would arise under increased market 
orientation of farmers= production decisions. 
The fund for Rural America became part of the USDA=s competitive grant=s program.  
This program focuses on increasing international competitiveness, efficiency, farm profitability, 
environmental stewardship, and rural community enhancement.  Its goal was to fund applied,  
 
7 
developmental, and adaptive research, technology transfer, extension, and related outreach 
activities and extension.  Also, it emphasized multi-disciplinary and system approaches to 
research for large rural problems and the integration of research, education, and extension.  
Collaboration, partnerships, and cooperation across institutions and organizations were strongly 
encouraged.  When applied research was commodity specific or locally focused, matching 
federal with other funds was required.  For both the NRI and Fund for Rural America, the 
research agenda was set at the national level and scientists across a broad range of institutions 
were eligible to compete for the funds. 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GIPRA) of 1993 has meant strategic 
planning and annual program performance reporting for every agency of the federal government, 
including the Cooperative Research, Education, Extension Service which oversees the federal 
formula funding of agricultural research and extension of the land-grant universities (U.S. 
Congress 1993).    This legislation was stimulated by concerns in the U.S. Congress for greater 
accountability to taxpayers for the performance of  programs and a need for better planning of 
federal programs. 
The 1998 Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act (AREERA), 
however, has superseded GIPRA.  The 1998 act applies to land grant institutions receiving Hatch 
(research) and Smith-Lever (extension) formula funds from the federal government (U.S. 
Congress 1998).    As a part of accountability, every university must file a Aplan of work@ for 
use of authorized funds, integrate research and extension activities (for roughly 25 percent of the 
funds), implement a process for obtaining stakeholder input concerning the uses of research, 
extension, and education formula funds, and see that a merit review of programs are conducted at  
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least once every five years.  Also, the requirements of regional research were extended to be 
multi-state, multi-institutional, and multi-disciplinary.  In addition, multi-state extension 
programs are required for the first time, and the National Academy of Sciences was requested to 
study the role and mission of federally funded agricultural research, extension, and education.  
In particular, the Academy is to focus on the strength of science in the USDA=s Agricultural 
Research Service programs; how ARS relates to capacity of the U.S. agricultural research, 
extension, and education system; examine appropriateness of the Aformula@ for allocating Hatch 
(research) and Smith-Lever (extension) funds to the states; and examine the system of 
competitive grants for agricultural research, extension, and education. 
In carrying out the 1998 legislation, CSREES has established the following five goals for 
its next five-year plan and expects the supporting institutions to conform to the guidelines: 
(i) an agricultural system that is highly competitive in the global economy, (ii) a safe and secure 
food and fiber system, (iii) a health, well-nourished population, (iv) greater harmony between 
agriculture and the environment, and (iv) enhanced economic opportunity and quality of life for 
Americans.    
The strengthening of intellectual property rights to biological innovations started in 1970 
with creation of the plant-variety-protection system and continued during the 1980s with the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond vs. Chakrabarty (1980) which extended patent 
protection to living organisms, the subsequent ruling by the Patent and Trademarks Office=s 
Board of Appeals which extended this decision in Ex parte Hibberd (1985) to cover all plants, 
including open-pollinated seeds, and the Board=s decision in 1987 in Ex parte Allen which 
extended patents to cover nonhuman animal genes, traits, and breeds. The recent changes in the  
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intellectual property rights system to accommodate the products from the applications of the 
1980 Cohen-Boyer patent on the basic technique of gene-splicing (recombinant DNA) and the 
potential for transgenetic organisms, plants, and animals have opened many new opportunities 
for  profits to the private sector. The advances in biological and information science and 
strengthening of IPRs have been major factors in the accelerated rate of growth of private 
agricultural R&D expenditures in the U.S. since 1977 relative to public agricultural research 
expenditures (Fuglie et al; Huffman and Evenson 1993).  The restructuring in the U.S. of the 
chemical/life sciences and seed industries around Monsanto, Dow and Dupont (see figure 1) is 
raising new issues about public-private sector relations in the advance of science and technology 
for agriculture.  In 1988, all of the current Asatellites@ of these companies were operating as 
independent businesses. 
The USDA has expanded its research efforts to some extent through joint ventures. These 
include the use of cooperative agreements that are jointly funded and performed largely with 
SAES and veterinarian medicine schools and cooperative research and development agreements 
(CRADAs).  Cooperative research agreements between the USDA and agricultural experiment 
stations have been in existence for a long time, but CRADAs resulted from the 1986 Technology 
Transfer Act.  This legislation permits federal laboratories to enter into CRADAs with 
universities, private companies, non-federal government entities, etc.  The principle goal of 
CRADA is to stimulate technology transfer activities by linking the pre-invention scientific 
research capacity of federal laboratories with commercial research and marketing expertise of 
the private sector.  Under a CRADA, partners put up resources, and the nonfederal partner 
receives the right of first refusal to any joint discovery and may be given exclusive access to data  
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from a joint project.  CRADA activity has increased rapidly, amounting to over 500 projects by 
1995 (Fuglie, et al 1996, p.56), but private sector CRADA resources are less than 1 percent of 
the budget of the Agricultural Research Service (Cole 1998). 
Changing Organization of Science and Research  
New developments in the organization of agricultural research.  Three major changes 
are highlighted.  First, the U.S. Congress has reduced real funding for formula and program 
funding (traditional federal funding of public agricultural research) and increased centrally 
controlled competitive grant funding.  Federal expenditure on biological research by the USDA=s 
Agricultural Research service were $438 million in 1988 (real 1984 dol.) and decreased to $420 
million in 1997, a 4.2 percent decline.  The USDA=s expenditures on social science research 
(ERS) decreased from $40 million in 1988 to $33 million in 1997 (real 1984 dol.), a 19.4 percent 
decline.  For the state agricultural experiment station system (SAES), real grand total research 
expenditures increased slightly (2.2 percent) from 1988 to 1997, or from $1,145 million to 
1,202 million (1984 dol.).  The share of SAES system funding coming from federal-regular- 
formula funds declined by 1.2 percentage point which was a combination of a decline of 2.8 
percentage points in the share coming from regular-federal-formula funding and a 1 percentage 
point increase in the USDA competitive grants programs, i.e., the NRI, and an 0.7 percentage 
point increase in the share from special grants programs. Second, public agricultural research 
scientists are being encouraged to pursue nontraditional sources of funding such as federal funds 
outside the USDA, private corporations, and producers (commodity) groups.  The share of SAES 
system funds coming from contracts and grants with non-USDA federal agencies increased by 
2.7 percentage points over 1988 to 1997.  Also, the share of USDA contracts and cooperative  
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agreements with the SAES system increased by 1.2  percentage points.  The share of funding for 
the SAES system from private sector sources (e.g., private industry, commodity groups, 
foundations) increased by 2.2 percentage points.  Therefore, the largest increase in SAES system 
funding over 1988 to 1997 has been from non-USDA federal and private sector sources and the 
primary decline has been in the relative importance of regular federal formula funding. 
The funding of the USDA=s own research operations is almost exclusively by the federal 
government, but the CRADAs have provided a new and still relatively small source of research 
funds, largely for ARS research.  Third, public universities are increasingly entertaining and 
entering into exclusive joint ventures with a particular large ag-chemical/life science company.  
The University of California-Berkeley has entered into an unusual joint venture with Novartis 
and other institutions are evaluating alternatives.  Novartis has agreed to provide $25 million for 
funding over 5 years of research projects largely in the Department of Plant and Microbial 
Biology, University of California-Berkeley, and to provide access to unusual plant germ plasm 
to their scientists.  The research funds for projects are to be channeled through a faculty 
controlled committee that will evaluate research proposals and give out the awards.  Novartis is 
given first right of refusal to negotiate a licensing agreement on all advances from research 
funded by Novartis money and those funded by federal money.
i  The Berkeley-Novartis 
arrangement is unusual in that other companies are excluded from working with faculty who are 
covered by the Novartis venture.  Departments frequently have had faculty contracting with 
competitors at the same time. 
Some other changes in the relative emphasis of the public and private sector have also 
occurred.  Within plant breeding, the public sector has largely withdrawn from hybrid corn,  
 
12 
cotton, and soybean varietal development and the private sector has taken a full role.  This trend 
has been in progress for at least 30 years, but accelerated after 1970.  In particular, the public 
sector is no longer a significant source of inbred lines for hybrid corn variety development 
(Huffman and Evenson 1993).  Thirty years ago, the public sector was also the dominant source 
of new varieties for soybeans and cotton, but this has all changed.  The private sector has 
become the dominant source in new vegetable variety development, too. 
In small grains, which are open pollinated, e.g., oats, wheat, barley, the private sector has 
found limited profitability in developing new varieties, and during the past decade, the private 
sector has largely pulled out of this seed market.  The public sector is the major source of new 
varieties for these crops. 
Over 1988 to 1998 the combination of building on advances in biology and information 
sciences and strengthening of IPRs has resulted in the private sector taking over a larger share of 
applied agricultural research where expected private sector profitability has been good.  In some 
other areas of applied research, the expected payoff rates has been negative or low, e.g., small 
grain varietal development, resource and environmental quality research, policy research, and 
work remains for the public sector to undertake.  Although the private sector finances a little 
research in the basic/general sciences and pre-technology science areas, discoveries in these 
areas are largely pure public goods and are difficult for the private sector to capture returns 
without patent or breeders= rights protection.  Overall the public sector has withdrawn from 
applied research that is in direct competition with the private sector and shifted its emphasis to 
research in the basic-general and pre-technology sciences.  
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Changing responsibilities of the public vis-a-vis private sector research.  Overall the 
rate of growth of private agricultural research funding has been growing faster than public 
agricultural research funds (Huffman and Evenson 1993; Fuglie, et al 1996).  The research of the 
private sector is heavily focused on applied agricultural production--new technologies for crop 
and livestock production.  The private sector, however, engages in relatively little research on 
natural resource management, regulation, policy and consumer protection.  It, however, invests a 
large amount in food and agro-industrial research (Huffman and Evenson 1993). 
In the U.S., the public sector, especially the public universities, have taken a larger role 
in basic and pre-technology scientific discoveries.  Since 1950, the USDA=s own agricultural 
research operation has been about one-half the size of the SAES system (Huffman and Evenson 
1993) . During 1988 to 1997, the rate of growth of funds for the SAES system was significantly 
larger than for the USDA=s research agencies, so the relative importance of the SAES system has 
increased.  The private sector has taken on a larger share of applied research as advances in 
science and strengthening of intellectual property rights have made private R&D profitable in 
more areas.  The private sector, however, continues to find applied research in some areas 
unprofitable and it has withdrawn during the 1990s from some areas of research.  For example, 
Pioneer Hibred gave up on wheat variety development and gave its wheat germ-plasm to Kansas 
State University. 
In the U.S., the driving forces behind accountability in public agricultural research has 
come primarily from the Federal government.  The concern has been (1) with what taxpayers are 
obtaining in the way of benefits from federal expenditures and (2) an attempt to undertake better 
planning of federal government programs.  Starting in the mid-1990s, the main focus of national  
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policies was to cut the size of the federal government budget deficit and achieve balance by 
2002.  Although fortuitous economic events brought a balanced federal budget much earlier than 
anticipated, the federal government is expected to carefully scrutinize research expenditures for 
agriculture in the foreseeable future. 
Institutional Changes Within the Agricultural Research System 
Institutional innovation in the field of governance and oversight.  Both GIPRA and the 
1998 Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act have been attempts to introduce new and 
effective strategic planning and regular performance reporting into agricultural research and 
education.  Although the intent of these policies is good, they contain a large amount of 
bureaucracy in their implementation.  GIPRA, which was broad legislation, lacked procedures or 
the flexibility to accommodate unusual attributes of research, e.g., large amount of ex ante 
uncertainty of payoff, long lags between input and payoff, asymmetric information on scientists= 
effort and difficult to monitor inputs, quality as the key dimension of output, heterogeneous 
productivity across scientists, relative to other government activities.  Hence GIPRA is a failure 
for public research.  AREERA was written specifically for research, extension, and education, 
but it too has bureaucratized accountability and reporting while making slightly accommodating 
the unique attributes of the research activity.  The legislation, however, seems likely to increase 
the amount of multi-state, multi-disciplinary, and multi-institutional research that is undertaken.  
It also is requiring extension to pursue a new multi-state focus and actively cooperate in 
agricultural research.  Institutions receiving federal formula funds must actively pursue non-
traditional stakeholders= input to agricultural research, extension, and education programs.  The  
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exact method by which stakeholder input is to be pursued, however, is left to each of the 
institutions to define. 
In the United States, there has not been any public policy to directly sell public 
agricultural research units (assets) to the private sector.  The type of privatization that has 
occurred has been one whereby the private sector has been permitted to assume a larger role in 
the financing and performance of agricultural research with it own resources.  The expected 
profitability of these activities has been enhanced by the creation of new intellectual property 
rights and the strengthening of existing IPRs.  The new R&D thrust of the private sector in 
biotechnology and information science does build heavily on prior advances in basic/general 
scientific discoveries that were part of public sector research, e.g., discovery of the electronic 
digital computer at Iowa State University in the late 1930s and associated technologies, the 
discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 and of recombinant DNA or gene splicing technology 
in the late 1970s.  There has been a significant increase in private sector funding of the SAES 
system over the reference period and a few private resources are going into USDA CRADAs. 
Institutional innovations in the field of finance.  Several changes have occurred 
immediately before and during the reference period.  First, the 1985 farm bill permitted 
agricultural commodity groups to vote (hold a referendum) for coverage by mandatory 
commodity check-off programs (levies) to finance commodity promotion and agricultural 
research.  If a referendum passed then a commodity group was designated to manage the check-
off funds, e.g., the National Pork Council for the pork check-off funds, the National Corn 
Growers Association for the corn check-off funds.  This check-off or producer levy program has 
continued through 1999, although producers  have raised issues about the payoff to them of  
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expenditures on the promotion and research programs.  Second, the share of regular federal 
appropriations for agricultural research that is allocated through competitive grants programs has 
doubled over the 1988-98 period, from about 8 to 17 percent.  Third, SAES scientists have been 
increasingly pursuing non-USDA federal sources of research funding over the period and these 
funds are allocated largely through competitive grant programs.  Thus, theses three changes in 
financing of agricultural research have increased the role of the performing research institution 
and its scientists in raising money or pursuing research funds. 
The federal formula funding of agricultural research and extension has a long history of a 
matching requirement for the 1862 land-grant institutions, but the 1998 Agricultural Research, 
Extension and Education Reform Act extended the matching requirement for federal research 
and extension funds to 1890 (previously all black) land-grant institutions and Tuskegee Institute 
(see Committee on the Future of the Colleges of Agriculture...1995 for location of these 
institutions).  
There is undocumented evidence of an increase (from a very small base) of endowed 
chairs for agricultural research being established during the reference period in land-grant 
universities funded by private donors, e.g., private industry, wealthy alumni, etc.  The USDA-
ERS has increased slightly its emphasis on contract research through cooperative agreements 
with outside scientists after it downsized its research staff during the early 1990s. 
Institutional innovations in the field of research implementation.  During the reference 
period, many public agricultural research institutions have felt some scarcity of funds or Atighter 
budgets@ and most have implemented new management strategies, e.g., more emphasis on 
reviewing project proposals, shortening the length of projects, eliminating research assistantship  
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funding, direct involvement in current expense allocation.   The effectiveness of the more active 
management strategy has, however, been debated, e.g., see Huffman and Just (1999a,b), and 
might be counter productive. 
During the reference period, there has been an increase in USDA-private sector joint-
venture research and a slight increase in SAES-private sector joint ventures.  However, the 
spotlight for these public-private joint ventures has shifted from the chemical/pharmaceutical to 
the biotechnology/life science industries.  For the most part, the large chemical companies of the 
1980s, e.g., Monsanto, Dow, Dupont, have become the large life-science companies of the late 
1990s as industrial restructuring has occurred (Rausser et al 1999). 
The SAES system was established with the guarantee of federal formula funding, but the 
SAES system had few restrictions placed on other funding options.  Over time the SAES system 
has developed a diversified portfolio of funding sources which has allowed it to grow faster 
during the study period than the research component of USDA agencies, which rely very heavily 
on federal government funding (Huffman and Evenson 1993).  This means that within the public 
sector, the performance of agricultural research is shifting further toward the SAES/university 
system.   
During the reference period, there is no documented evidence of increased importance of 
international research networks or multi-institutional research programs.  This, however, does 
not mean that no increase has occurred because the dramatic reduction in the real cost of long 
distance communication through the use of steadily improving e-mail services, especially for 




The most dramatic forces for change in U.S. public agricultural research during 1988 to 
1999 were the 21 percent decline of real federal government revenues and 27 percent increase in 
state government revenues.  The realities of the federal budget changes were a 5.5 percent 
decline in real resources for the USDA=s own agricultural research and a 22 percent decline in 
federal-formula funding of the state agricultural-experiment-station system and of state budget 
changes were a surprising decline by 4.8 percent in real resources for the SAES system.  Because 
the SAES system had a diverse funding base coming into the period, real SAES resources for 
research actually increased by 2.2 percent over the period.  Large SAES-system resource 
increases were obtained from the private sector, non-USDA federal government sources, and 
contract and cooperative agreement funding from USDA research agencies.  Of potential long-
term concern to the SAES system is the decline in real resources from state governments, given 
the large increase in state government revenues and approximately 50 percent share of state 
government funding of the SAES system. 
The private sector allocates significantly more resources to agricultural research than the 
total of all resources allocated to agricultural research in the public sector, and over the study 
period, the rate of growth of private sector funding of its own research was growing faster than  
public sector agricultural research funds.  Two main forces were operating: unusual 
opportunities for private R&D from applications of discoveries in biological and information 
sciences and strengthening intellectual property rights to scientific discoveries.  The momentum 
of these events seem likely to carry well into the 21st century.  The relative size of agricultural 
R&D of the private sector is expected to continue to grow in the United States, and the public  
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agricultural research is expected to place greater emphasis on research in basic/general and pre-
technology sciences and in applied research that is not directly competitive with the private 
sector. 
Although peer-review competitive grants programs for allocating funds among research 
projects and scientists have grown in popularity during the 1990s, only 16 percent of regular 
federal appropriations for agricultural research were allocated by competitive grants programs in 
1997.  The popularity of grants programs seems likely to wane during the 21st century.  The 
primary reason is that competitive grants from external funding sources are a relatively 
inefficient allocation mechanism, especially where the number of research scientists working in 
a field is small or where a large amount of experience has been accumulated with more efficient 
allocation mechanisms.  However, setting strong incentives for scientific discovery in public 
research institutions will continue to be an important management activity in the 21st century. 
The bureaucratic approaches to accountability in government which have been applied in 
the U.S. to federally funded programs will prove ineffective for research.  The policies have paid 
too little attention to the unusual attributes of research, e.g., the large amount of ex ante 
uncertainty in high quality research, long lags from input of resources to payoff.  Furthermore, to 
the extent that these programs have an impact they most likely will cause state governments to 
ask what they are getting from their major share of SAES funding.  Given that agricultural 
research in public institutions which is funded by contracts and federal grants has been shown by 
Huffman and Just (1994) to have a significantly smaller state-specific or local public goods 
component than federal formula and state government program funding, scientific discoveries 
from different major types of funding sources for public agricultural research are not perfect  
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substitutes.  Over the next decade state legislatures seem likely to see generally that national or 
private sector re-direction of state funds for agricultural research to serve national or private 
sector interests is a poor investment to them.  When SAES administrators and scientists 
overemphasize chasing outside funding from federal and private sources, they will seriously 
jeopardize the majority of the SAES system funding base which comes from state governments.  
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i.  At least for the University of California-Berkeley, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1982, which 
effectively transferred intellectual property rights to discoveries financed at least partially 
by federal funds to the nonfederal partner, has been important in developing a future 
financing strategy for plant biology research (Rausser 1999; Busch et al. 2004). 